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SUPERVISORY LIABILITY POST-IQBAL: A “MISNOMER” 
INDEED 
Desiree L. Grace
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
1
 
has generated enormous scholarly interest and, within just ten 
months of being decided, became the seventy-sixth most cited Su-
preme Court case of all time.
2
  Yet, academic attention has focused 
primarily on whether the Court’s imposition of a “plausibility” plead-
ing standard substantially altered the traditionally liberal pleading 
standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
  Scholars have 
paid far less attention to another important—and potentially confus-
ing—impact of the decision: whether it fundamentally changed the 
standards for alleging “supervisory liability” against high-level gov-
ernment officials. 
As a result of some arguably broad language in the majority opi-
nion, as well as suggestions by Justice Souter in his dissenting opi-
nion, some courts have interpreted Iqbal as holding that supervisors 
are not liable for their mere “knowledge and acquiescence” in their 
subordinates’ conduct, and that consequently, a plaintiff must plausi-
bly allege that the supervisor himself personally engaged in the chal-
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 
2009, University of Maryland.  I would like to thank Dan McGrady, Jeff Mongiello, 
and Rebecca Garibotto for their suggestions and edits.  I would also like to thank Er-
ic Latzer for his input and his support, and I would like to thank my family for their 
love and assistance.  Lastly, I would like to thank Professor Baher Azmy for his tho-
rough feedback, his invaluable teaching, and his ongoing guidance throughout the 
past few years. 
 1 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 2 Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1359 (2010) 
(noting that as of March 17, 2010, federal courts and tribunals had cited Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal 6,620 times). 
 3 E.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Edward A. Hartnett, The Chang-
ing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 473 (2010); Lee H. Rosenthal, Pleading, for the Future: Conversations After Iqbal, 
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1537 (2010); Steinman, supra note 2. 
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lenged conduct.
4
  Such an interpretation would create a dramatic 
shift in the law of supervisory liability, as cases previously brought un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have suggested that supervisors could be held 
liable upon proof of something short of personal direction or direct 
involvement.
5
 
Other courts and some early commentators suggest a more re-
strained reading of Iqbal.  This narrower interpretation suggests that 
Iqbal’s ruling should be limited to its facts: “knowledge and acquies-
cence” is insufficient to satisfy supervisory liability in situations where 
the substantive cause of action requires proof of discriminatory in-
tent.
6
  Fundamentally, this limited reading indicates that the requisite 
showing for a supervisory liability claim varies depending on the type 
of underlying constitutional violation alleged. 
In this Comment, I seek to resolve the confusion among these 
competing interpretations, and offer a more coherent and durable 
 
 4 See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010); Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1227 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 2010). 
 5 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that 
local governing bodies can be liable where “the action that is alleged to be unconsti-
tutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or deci-
sion officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers”); Preschooler II v. 
Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007) ( “[A] supervisor is 
liable for the acts of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 
violations, or knew of the violations [of subordinates] and failed to act to prevent 
them.”) (internal citations omitted); Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 
1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act by 
the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.”) (internal citations omitted); Estate of 
Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (allowing supervi-
sory liability for failure to train or supervise); Ottman v. City of Indep., 341 F.3d 751, 
761 (8th Cir. 2003) (imposing liability “when the supervisor’s corrective inaction 
constitutes deliberate indifference toward the violation”); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that a supervisor may be liable upon a showing 
of “a history of widespread abuse [that] puts the responsible supervisor on notice of 
the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”); Doe v. City of 
Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that in order to hold supervisory 
defendants liable, plaintiff must show that the defendants’ conduct amounted to de-
liberate indifference or, put differently, “to a tacit authorization of the abuse”); 
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (allowing supervisory 
liability on a failure to train claim when “the need for more or different training was 
so obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of constitutional rights that the poli-
cymaker’s failure to respond amounts to deliberate indifference”); O’Neill v. Baker, 
210 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that supervisory liability requires the plaintiff 
to “show that the supervisor possessed either the state of mind for the particular con-
stitutional violation or deliberate indifference, and . . . played a causal role in plain-
tiff’s constitutional deprivation”) (internal citations omitted). 
 6 See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15283, at *10–11 
(9th Cir. July 25, 2011); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1204 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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theory of pleading supervisory liability.  Part II of this Comment will 
discuss the Iqbal opinion and provide a general overview of the con-
cept of supervisory liability and its relationship to the doctrine of 
qualified immunity.  It will then consider the various interpretations 
of the Iqbal opinion and analyze the policy implications and practical 
considerations resulting from each approach.  Next, based on both 
the language of the Iqbal opinion and the context in which the deci-
sion was made, Part III will conclude that the ruling on the scope of 
supervisory liability was limited and could not have categorically ab-
olished the concept of supervisory liability.  Finally, Part IV will ana-
lyze pre-Iqbal case law in conjunction with the Iqbal holding to suggest 
a clarified, two-prong standard.  Specifically, prong one is a requisite 
personal involvement and prong two is a requisite mental state asso-
ciated with the particular cause of action asserted. 
In sum, this Comment will argue that the Iqbal decision did not 
alter the requirement that government officials must be personally 
involved; it simply reiterated this requirement by stating that officials 
are only liable “for their own misconduct.”
7
  Additionally, this Com-
ment concludes that the decision did alter the obligation to plead 
facts relevant to the state-of-mind required for the particular cause of 
action.  Knowledge of a subordinate’s misconduct and an unreasona-
ble or reckless reaction to that misconduct will no longer be suffi-
cient in every situation.  Rather, the official’s mental state will vary, as 
it must reflect the level of intent required by the underlying violation. 
II. IQBAL, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AND CONFUSION OVER STANDARDS OF 
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY 
A. The Iqbal Decision. 
As noted, attorneys and scholars cite Ashcroft v. Iqbal primarily for 
its language pertaining to pleading standards.
8
  Iqbal involved a Bi-
vens
9
 action against several high-level federal officials, including the 
former Attorney General of the United States and the former Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
10
  A central dispute 
 
 7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 8 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 3; Rosenthal, supra note 3. 
 9 A Bivens action is the federal analog to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 21–26.  Section 1983 gives plaintiffs the right to sue state government offi-
cials in their individual capacity for their official actions.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  
Bivens creates a parallel cause of action for claims against federal officials.  Bivens, 403 
U.S. 388. 
 10 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
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in Iqbal pertained to the standard for supervisory liability.
11
  Supervi-
sory liability centers on instances where courts hold high-level gov-
ernment officials liable for their subordinates’ actions.  The law is 
clear that there is no respondeat superior liability,
12
 but the law is un-
clear as to the point at which supervisors assume responsibility.
13
 
Javaid Iqbal was a Muslim, Pakistani citizen arrested in the Unit-
ed States on November 2, 2001—shortly after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks—on criminal charges of conspiracy to defraud the 
United States and fraud with identification.
14
  After approximately 
two months of incarceration at the Metropolitan Detention Center in 
Brooklyn (MDC), Iqbal was moved from general population
15
 to the 
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit as a result of being 
designated a person “of high interest” in the September 11th investi-
gations.
16
  Iqbal alleged that he was deprived of various constitutional 
protections, including his First and Fifth Amendment rights, and 
brought suit against an extensive list of defendants.
17
  Specifically, Iq-
bal brought the action against members of the MDC staff,
18
 officials 
from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), officials from the FBI, and the At-
torney General.
19
 
In his suit against these high-level officials, Iqbal alleged that the 
FBI arrested and detained thousands of Muslims during the Septem-
ber 11th investigations, and that many of these arrestees and detai-
nees were classified as “high interest” solely on the basis of their race, 
religion, or national origin.
20
  A designation “of high interest” alle-
gedly had a direct effect on the duration and conditions of an arres-
 
 11 See id. 
 12 Respondeat superior is “the doctrine holding an employer or principal liable 
for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the em-
ployment or agency.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2008). 
 13 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 
 14 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 15 “General population” refers to the environment in prison where a prisoner has 
access to other inmates.  See Julia Dahl, Is It Time to Ban Solitary Confinement?,  CRIME 
REP. (Oct. 12, 2009), http://thecrimereport.org/2009/10/12/is-it-time-to-ban-
solitary-confinement/#.  Contrast this to solitary confinement where a prisoner is 
kept in isolation from other prisoners and is locked in his or her cell for up to twen-
ty-three hours per day.  Id. 
 16 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148. 
 17 Id. at 147. 
 18 Dennis Hasty, the first named defendant, was the former warden of the MDC 
where Iqbal was detained. 
 19 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 147. 
 20 Id. at 148. 
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tee’s detention.
21
  The Supreme Court’s decision dealt only with peti-
tioners John Ashcroft, the Attorney General of the United States at 
the time of Iqbal’s arrest and detention, and Robert Mueller, the 
then-Director of the FBI.
22
  Iqbal claimed that these defendants im-
plemented an unconstitutional policy that caused him to endure 
harsh conditions of confinement solely because of his race, religion, 
or national origin.
23
  Iqbal asserted that “Ashcroft was the policy’s 
‘principal architect’ and Mueller was ‘instrumental’ in its adoption 
and execution.”
24
 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York denied Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion to dismiss Iqbal’s discrim-
ination claim based on a defense of qualified immunity, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.
25
  Ashcroft and Mueller petitioned for cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court seeking clarification of their personal 
liability for constitutional violations that their subordinates allegedly 
caused.
26
 
Iqbal brought his claims as a Bivens action.
27
  Bivens claims are 
the federal analog to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, which are brought un-
der state law.
28
  A § 1983 action is a claim for damages against a state 
government official in his or her individual capacity for alleged viola-
tions of constitutional rights.
29
  The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
states: 
Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equi-
ty, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .30 
A Bivens action, then, is a claim for damages against federal offi-
cials in their individual capacity for alleged violations of constitution-
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
 23 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 13:69, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 
No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), ECF No. 35 
[hereinafter Elmaghraby First Amended Complaint]. 
 24 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1939. 
 25 Elmaghraby, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *114. 
 26 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
(No. 07-1015). 
 27 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
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al rights.
31
  Neither a § 1983 claim nor a Bivens action can succeed on 
a theory of vicarious liability; the Supreme Court has rejected a 
theory of respondeat superior to hold government officials liable.
32
  
As a result, the majority opinion in Iqbal concluded that “[a] plaintiff 
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
33
  The 
Court explained that the requisite showing for a Bivens violation “will 
vary with the constitutional provision at issue.”
34
  Therefore, as an ex-
ample, an analysis of a Fourth Amendment violation should differ 
from that of an Eighth Amendment violation.  In Iqbal, the alleged 
constitutional violations were those of the First and Fifth Amend-
ments.
35
  In an effort to clarify the ruling regarding the volatility of 
Bivens analyses and to apply the Bivens standard to the Iqbal facts, the 
Supreme Court specified that “[w]here the claim is invidious discrim-
ination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our deci-
sions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the de-
fendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”
36
 
B. Basic Principles of Supervisory Liability and Qualified Immunity 
The doctrine of supervisory liability is relevant in the public sec-
tor in situations in which an individual suffers a violation of a consti-
tutionally protected right and seeks to hold those government offi-
cials who are responsible for the violation personally liable.
37
  The law 
is clear that there is no respondeat superior in the context of supervi-
sory liability,
38
 but jurisdictions are split as to when liability attaches to 
a supervisor.
39
  Supervisory liability exists in order to provide high-
 
 31 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–67 (2001) (citing Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971)). 
 32 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 33 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Elmaghraby First Amended Complaint, supra note 23. 
 36 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added). 
 37 See generally Sheldon Nahmod, Pondering Iqbal: Constitutional Torts, Over-
Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279 (2010) 
(explaining the basic foundation of supervisory liability, arguing that the Iqbal deci-
sion was the result of the Court’s increasing concern with over-deterrence, and advo-
cating for the constitutional approach for Bivens and § 1983 cases). 
 38 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 39 See, e.g., Allen v. Heinzle, 351 F. App’x 145, 146 (7th Cir. 2009) (requiring con-
trol over the situation and deliberate indifference); Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 
F.3d 522, 538 (7th Cir. 2009) (indicating that liability would be permissible for 
promulgating a policy that required or encouraged the violation of inmates’ rights); 
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that, in some 
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level officials with the incentive to prevent and eliminate misconduct 
by their subordinates.
40
  Likewise, it provides a means of compensa-
tion for the victims of misconduct.
41
 
While, in some circumstances, tort law recognizes that supervi-
sors may be held vicariously liable for their subordinates’ conduct,
42
 
courts have long held that it does not make sense to extend vicarious 
liability to government employment situations.
43
  This stems from the 
need for government officials to perform their duties without the dis-
traction of potential liability.
44
  Because of this preference for permit-
ting government officials to make sweeping policy decisions without 
fear of personal liability, the doctrine of qualified immunity exists as 
another measure of protection.
45
 
When supervisory officials are sued under a § 1983 or Bivens ac-
tion, they will commonly assert the qualified immunity defense.
46
  A 
claim of qualified immunity is essentially an argument that, despite 
the existence of a constitutional violation, the government official 
should not be held liable in his or her individual capacity for that vi-
olation because he or she was acting reasonably and pursuant to his 
 
circumstances, liability is permissible for failure to train, supervise, or hire appro-
priately). 
 40 See generally Kit Kinports, Iqbal and Supervisory Immunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1291 (2010). 
 41 Id. 
 42 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 69–70, at 499–505 
(5th ed. 1984) (citing Talbot Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 
38 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1940)) (stating that a supervisor’s “vicarious liability, for con-
duct which is in no way his own, extends to any and all tortious conduct of the ser-
vant which is within the ‘scope of the employment’” and subsequently explaining the 
circumstances that fall within the “scope of employment” ambit). 
 43 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 44 George D. Brown, Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit—The Bivens Impasse, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 876 (2009) (“Immunity protects the official from the burden of 
litigation and also furthers the government’s interest in having zealous officials.”); see 
also Kinports, supra note 40, at 1295. 
 45 Nahmod, supra note 37, at 286. 
 46 Id.; Brown, supra note 44, at 875 (asserting that the qualified immunity defense 
is one of the two most prominent defenses); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Suc-
cess of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 809, 812 (2010) (suggesting that the lack of success of Bivens litigation is due, in 
part, to the fact that “Bivens plaintiffs are disadvantaged because the personal de-
fense of qualified immunity is an imposing barrier to recovery from federal officers”) 
(internal citations omitted); William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort 
Liability of Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 1105, 1143 (1996) (“Since the 1980s, it has become very difficult for plaintiffs 
. . . to win a Bivens case.”); see also id. at 1152, 1164–65. 
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or her official role.
47
  The purpose of the qualified immunity defense 
is to “shield [government officials] from undue interference with 
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”
48
  As a 
result, the Court has said that “high officials require greater protec-
tion than those with less complex discretionary responsibilities.”
49
  
One prominent benefit of this defense is that qualified immunity is a 
shield from the burdens of discovery and the costs of litigation, not 
just a shield from liability.
50
 
Assessing the defense of qualified immunity typically requires a 
bifurcated inquiry.
51
  The first part of the inquiry is whether a consti-
tutional violation has actually occurred.
52
  Second, upon finding that 
a constitutional violation has occurred, the court must then deter-
mine whether the violated constitutional right was “clearly estab-
lished” at the time of the government official’s misconduct.
53
  Prior to 
2009, district courts were required to address these questions in this 
order.
54
  This meant that there could be a threshold finding of a con-
stitutional violation, even if the official could not be held liable.
55
  In 
Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts 
can choose to conduct the qualified immunity analysis in any order 
they wish.
56
  So, if a court finds it easier to rule that the right was not 
clearly established, it can do so without ruling on whether a constitu-
tional violation actually occurred.
57
  Conversely, even if the court 
finds that there was a constitutional violation, the government defen-
dant is still entitled to qualified immunity if the right was not “clearly 
established” at that time.
58
 
 
 47 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
 48 Id.; accord Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“Qualified immunity 
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when 
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”). 
 49 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
 50 Id. at 817; see also Brown, supra note 44, at 876 (“Immunity, if upheld, stops liti-
gation at an early stage.”). 
 51 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817. 
 52 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815–16.  
 53 Id. at 816; accord Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 54 See generally Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808. 
 55 See id. 
 56 Id. at 818. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 818–19.  See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6, at 
548–57 (5th ed. 2007) (analyzing the doctrine of qualified immunity, the practical 
application of the Harlow test, and current issues with determining when a right is 
“clearly established”). 
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In Iqbal, the Court collapsed the qualified immunity inquiry into 
the supervisory liability analysis.
59
  Under the Court’s view, a supervi-
sor does not violate a “clearly established” constitutional right if the 
supervisor is not personally responsible for the violation.
60
  In conflat-
ing these two analyses, the Court provided additional protections for 
the discretionary decisions that supervisory officials made; the Court 
likely did so for the same policy reasons that the qualified immunity 
defense was put in place.
61
  Uncertainty about the scope of supervi-
sory liability is problematic for both plaintiffs and defendants alike.  
Government officials need clear rules about the scope of their super-
visory responsibilities in order to avoid becoming overly cautious in 
the administration of their duties.
62
  At the same time, plaintiffs need 
to know how to plead and prove allegations against supervisors who, 
they believe, may be responsible for their constitutional injury. 
In sum, a coherent standard for supervisory liability is necessary 
because vicarious liability does not exist for government officials.  
While it is essential to provide government officials with protections 
that allow them to do their jobs properly, they must nonetheless have 
incentives to protect individuals’ constitutional rights. 
C. Various Interpretations of the Iqbal Decision 
Following the Iqbal decision, circuit courts have expressed uncer-
tainty about the appropriate standard for supervisory liability.
63
  Sev-
eral interpretations have emerged.
64
  One is that Iqbal eliminated su-
 
 59 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
In the context of determining whether there is a violation of clearly es-
tablished right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than 
knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for 
unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official 
charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent respon-
sibilities. 
Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See supra text accompanying notes 40–45. 
 62 Nahmod, supra note 37, at 286 (“The primary policy concern is that the func-
tions performed are so very important that we do not want this defendant—often 
high profile—to be worried about the possibility of being sued rather than focusing 
on making the difficult decisions that he or she is supposed to make.”). 
 63 See, e.g., Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it 
is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would 
provide a sufficient basis for holding . . . [the supervisory official] liable.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 64 See infra text accompanying notes 75–109. 
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pervisory liability entirely.
65
  An alternative interpretation is that Iqbal 
might now require plaintiffs to prove that the supervisors purposely 
intended to cause the constitutional violation, rather than permit any 
lesser standard such as unreasonableness, negligence, or reckless-
ness.
66
  Another related interpretation is that Iqbal is a limited ruling 
that applies only to intent-based claims or to situations involving ex-
igent circumstances and national security concerns.
67
 
As previously addressed, the current state of supervisory liability 
is unclear as courts have been uncertain regarding the Iqbal deci-
sion’s substance and scope.  Several circuit courts have noted in dicta 
that Iqbal might have altered the standard for all supervisory liability 
claims.
68
  In nearly all of these cases, though, the circuit courts have 
ruled on narrower grounds
69
 and have opted to refrain from making 
 
 65 Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1227 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 66 See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 992 n.13 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, C.J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) (“It is doubtful that the majority’s ‘knowing fail-
ure to act’ standard survived Iqbal.”). 
 67 For such an interpretation of Iqbal, see Nahmod, supra note 37. 
 68 See Lewis, 604 F.3d at 1227 n.3 (“[Iqbal] has generated significant debate about 
the continuing vitality and scope of supervisory liability not only in Bivens actions, but 
also in § 1983 suits like the one before us.”). 
At one end of the spectrum, the Iqbal dissenters seemed to believe that 
the majority opinion ‘eliminates . . . supervisory liability entirely . . . .  
At the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit has read Iqbal as 
possibly holding that ‘purpose . . . is required’ merely in cases of al-
leged racial discrimination by government officials, given that Iqbal it-
self involved allegations of racial discrimination and such discrimina-
tion only violates the Constitution when it is intentional. 
Id.; see also Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F. App’x 942, 947 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
basic concept of § 1983 or Bivens supervisory liability itself may no longer be tena-
ble.”); Bayer, 577 F.3d at 190 n.5 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge, with noth-
ing more, would provide a sufficient basis for holding . . . [the supervisory official] 
liable.”) (internal citations omitted); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 274 n.7 
(1st Cir. 2009) (“Some recent language from the Supreme Court may call into ques-
tion our prior circuit law on the standard for holding a public official liable for dam-
ages under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability.”). 
 69 Only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have actually interpreted the Iqbal decision 
regarding the standard for supervisory liability.  See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 
1185 (10th Cir. 2010); Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15283, at 
*10–11 (9th Cir. July 25, 2011). 
A plaintiff may . . . succeed in a § 1983 suit against a defendant-
supervisor by demonstrating: (1) the defendant promulgated, created, 
implemented, or possessed responsibility for the continued operation 
of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and 
(3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged con-
stitutional deprivation. 
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199. 
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broad pronouncements that Iqbal in fact eliminated the possibility of 
supervisory liability.
70
  In general, despite the seemingly clear lan-
guage of Iqbal, lower courts have been confused as to how broad the 
scope of the ruling was.
71
  This uncertainty is perhaps attributable to 
the rhetoric of Justice Souter’s passionate dissent.  Souter wrote, “Lest 
there be any mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the 
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liabil-
ity entirely.”
72
  He continued, “The nature of a supervisory liability 
theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions, 
for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very principle 
that the majority rejects.”
73
  Justice Souter then criticized the majority 
for allegedly allowing only two outcomes with the standard for super-
visory liability: (1) respondeat superior, or (2) no supervisory liability 
at all.
74
  This rhetoric may be responsible for the confusion regarding 
the substance and scope of the majority opinion. 
One interpretation of the scope of Iqbal—the view articulated by 
Justice Souter—is that Iqbal eliminated supervisory liability entirely.
75
  
This interpretation is derived, in part, from the language in the deci-
sion stating that “supervisory liability is a misnomer.”
76
  Some com-
mentators have understood this statement to mean that supervisory 
liability no longer exists as a distinct concept; rather, supervisors now 
must meet the same requirements as the subordinate.
77
  The majority 
opinion also explains that the supervisor must be personally involved 
in the alleged constitutional violation and that mere knowledge is in-
 
 70 See, e.g., Lewis, 604 F.3d 1221; Arocho, 367 F. App’x 942; al-Kidd, 580 F.3d 949; 
Bayer, 577 F.3d 186; Maldonado, 568 F.3d 263.  For articles outlining the confusion in 
the wake of the Iqbal decision, see Michael Dorf,  Pondering Iqbal: Iqbal and Bad Ap-
ples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217; Kinports, supra note 40; Nahmod, supra note 37; 
Victor Romero, Interrogating Iqbal: Intent, Inertia, and (a lack of) Imagination, 114 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1419 (2010). 
 71 See, e.g., Castellar v. Caporale, No. CV-04-3402, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91191 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010). 
 72 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 1958. 
 75 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30–31, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d 
949 (2010) (arguing that Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred because Iqbal 
held that government officials may never be personally liable for misconduct of sub-
ordinate officials); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Lest there be any 
mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liabili-
ty; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”). 
 76 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 77 See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Iqbal III: The Death of Supervisory Liability, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (May 19, 2009, 7:38 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2009/05/iqbal-iii-the-death-of-supervisory-liability.html. 
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sufficient to hold the supervisor liable.
78
  This first interpretation is 
derived from the opinion’s language—taken in the abstract and out 
of context—without the particularized application of these state-
ments to the specific constitutional violations alleged in the case.
79
 
According to proponents of this view, there is no supervisory lia-
bility, but rather, a supervisor is only liable if that supervisor directly 
participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
80
  Because there 
is undisputedly no respondeat superior liability for government offi-
cials,
81
 this interpretation of Iqbal suggests that supervisors can never 
be held liable for the conduct of their subordinates—that supervisory 
liability is dead.
82
 
The second interpretation of Iqbal’s supervisory liability standard 
is far narrower.  Under this interpretation, supervisors can be liable 
for their subordinates’ constitutional violations only upon a showing 
of intent to cause such violations, regardless of the basis for the un-
derlying claim.
83
  This interpretation stems from the fact that in Iqbal, 
the Court required a showing of purpose or intent for the allegations 
of First and Fifth Amendment violations.
84
  Under this interpretation 
of Iqbal, a supervisor would be liable if he or she directly instructed a 
subordinate to commit an act that violated an individual’s constitu-
tional rights, so long as the plaintiff could prove that the supervisor 
had the intention for such a result to occur.
85
 
In line with the previous suggestion, a third interpretation is that 
the Iqbal ruling, requiring a showing of purpose or intent, was limited 
to those situations in which the underlying violation is an intent-
 
 78 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 79 For an example of this interpretation, see Wasserman, supra note 77. 
 80 Id.  In a case raising this very issue, the government argued that high level su-
pervisory officials of ICE—sued for an alleged pattern and practice of unconstitu-
tional home raids on immigrants—could only be liable if they themselves “directly 
planned or participated” in the underlying raids at issue.  They rejected plaintiffs’ 
proposed theory that those high level officials could be held liable for their know-
ledge of, and acquiescence in, the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.  
Brief for Appellants at 24, 31, Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
No. 10-1479 (3d Cir. Oct. 6, 2010), ECF No. 003110306015. 
 81 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 82 See Wasserman, supra note 77. 
 83 See, e.g., Individual Federal Defendants Myers, Torres, Weber, and Rodriquez’s 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 20–21, Argueta v. U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 08-1652 (D.N.J. June 18, 2009), ECF No. 
108 [hereinafter Individual Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss] (“An allegation 
of ‘mere knowledge,’ however, is not enough to hold a supervisor personally liable in 
a Bivens action.”). 
 84 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 
 85 See Individual Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 20–21.  
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based claim.
86
  Under this interpretation, the required mental state of 
the supervisor will mirror that of the subordinate and will be derived 
from the underlying constitutional claim.
87
  With this understanding, 
claimants for Eighth Amendment violations or Fourth Amendment 
violations need not show purpose or intent.  Rather, they must satisfy 
each amendment’s mental state—namely, recklessness and objective 
unreasonableness, respectively.
88
 
For clarification of the various interpretations, consider a hypo-
thetical: there are three officials: (1) a patrol officer, (2) a superior 
officer, and (3) a chief officer.  The superior officer sees his subordi-
nate patrol officer searching the passenger compartment of every car 
pulled over for a traffic violation.  The superior officer does not in-
tervene.  The chief officer hears that this type of conduct is occurring 
but fails to investigate or remedy any wrongdoing.  Assume for the 
sake of the hypothetical that the patrolman’s search violates the driv-
er’s clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment, and that 
a reasonable officer would have known that he or she was violating 
the individual’s constitutional rights; accordingly, the patrolman 
would not be entitled to the qualified immunity defense.
89
 
Applying the first interpretation—that supervisory liability is ab-
olished—only the patrol officer who actually conducted the unlawful 
search of the individual’s passenger compartment during the traffic 
stop would be liable under a § 1983 or Bivens action.  The superior 
officer would not be liable because his failure to intervene would be 
insufficient to satisfy the heightened supervisory liability standard.  
The same rationale applies to the chief officer who merely heard that 
the unconstitutional conduct was occurring.  The lack of direct in-
volvement would shield the supervisory defendants from liability un-
der this interpretation even when the plaintiff’s right to be free from 
the patrolman’s search is clearly established. 
 
 86 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Individual Defen-
dants’ Motion for Reconsideration at 3–4, Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, No. 08-1652 (D.N.J. June 22, 2009), ECF No. 109 (explaining that Iqbal 
logically required intent or purpose for supervisors because it is “hornbook law that, 
in order to state a claim for racial discrimination . . . or religious discrimination . . . a 
plaintiff must prove that the relevant decision-maker discriminated specifically on 
the basis of race or religion—i.e. with an invidious purpose or mindset”).  Thus, the 
requirement of purpose or intent in Iqbal was derived from the underlying constitu-
tional claim and not from the defendant’s status as a supervisor.  Id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994); U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 89 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
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Applying the second interpretation—that purpose or intent is 
required regardless of the underlying violation—the patrol officer 
would be liable for actually conducting the unlawful search that vi-
olated the driver’s constitutional rights.  In addition, the superior of-
ficer could be liable if the choice not to intervene was subjectively 
motivated by his intent to violate the driver’s rights.  Likewise, the 
chief officer would be liable only if the plaintiff could present evi-
dence that the chief officer failed to respond to the concerns about 
which he knew because the chief officer intended for third parties to 
endure violations of their constitutional rights.
90
 
Lastly, recall that the third interpretation requires a showing of 
the mental state mandated by the underlying violation.  Because this 
is a Fourth Amendment violation, the mental state would need to re-
flect the underlying requirement of objective unreasonableness.
91
  
Applying this interpretation to the hypothetical, the patrol officer 
would be liable for actually conducting the unlawful search that 
caused the constitutional violation.  Additionally, the superior officer 
would be liable for failing to intervene and stop his subordinate from 
causing the constitutional violation because this would be objectively 
unreasonable.  To satisfy the personal involvement requirement for a 
Fourth Amendment claim, the standard of knowledge and acquies-
cence would be permissible.
92
  If a court applied that standard, the 
chief officer would likely be liable because he was aware of the consti-
tutional violations and acquiesced in that behavior through his fail-
ure to act and train his subordinates to refrain from engaging in such 
conduct.  His personal liability would be permissible if his failure to 
act was objectively unreasonable. 
The final interpretation of the Iqbal decision is that the holding 
is limited to the exigent circumstances surrounding Ashcroft and 
Mueller’s policy decisions.
93
  Ashcroft argued that national security 
interests should be relevant to the Court’s decision regarding his 
 
 90 Holding the supervisors liable in this type of situation, while relatively simple 
in theory, would be exceedingly difficult in practice.  This is, in large part, due to the 
Iqbal decision pertaining to the pleading standard.  While not the focus of this Com-
ment, the Iqbal Court’s holding that allegations that are merely conclusory do not 
merit the presumption of truth that factual allegations receive in a motion to dismiss 
or motion for summary judgment.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009). 
 91 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 92 See discussion Part V infra. 
 93 See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 37; Steinman, supra note 2, at 1326 (referring to 
Iqbal as an “exceptional” case). 
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qualified immunity.
94
  In order to understand the basis for suggesting 
such an interpretation, it is essential to detail the national security 
situation that Ashcroft and Mueller faced.  The record showed that 
after the attacks on September 11th, the Department of Justice in-
itiated an extensive investigation in an attempt to apprehend those 
responsible.
95
  Over 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel 
were involved in this initiative, and within one week, the FBI had 
96,000 potential leads.
96
  In response to this situation, the FBI ques-
tioned over 1,000 potential suspects regarding the attacks and terror-
ism generally.
97
  Out of the 1,000 initially questioned, “762 were held 
on immigration charges . . . and a 184-member subset of that group 
was deemed to be of high interest to the investigation.”
98
  Those who 
were designated as “high interest” suspects were imprisoned in such a 
manner so as to eliminate the potential for communication with oth-
er suspected terrorists.
99
 
Ashcroft argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity and 
urged the district court to dismiss his claims given the “unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the 
United States.”
100
  Although both lower courts rejected this argument, 
one can argue that the Supreme Court considered it a pertinent fac-
tor in reversing the lower courts’ decisions.  After all, Judge Ca-
branes’s concurring opinion from the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reflected a general concern for subjecting high-level 
government officials to liability for decisions made regarding national 
security.
101
  Judge Cabranes articulated the need for additional leeway 
because society does not want the most qualified individuals to reject 
high-level positions due to fear of personal liability.
102
  Likewise, socie-
 
 94 Motion to Dismiss the Claims Against Attorney General John Ashcroft in His 
Individual Capacity at 5, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21434 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)(No. 04-CV-1809)[hereinafter Motion to Dis-
miss Claims Against Ashcroft]. 
 95 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1, 11–12 (2003)). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Ashcroft, supra note 94 (quoting Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). 
 101 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, C.J., concur-
ring). 
 102 Id. 
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ty does not benefit from deterring supervisory officials from making 
certain controversial decisions because of this same fear.
103
 
In sum, Judge Cabranes conceded that the majority’s “discussion 
of the relevant pleading standards reflect[ed] the uneasy compro-
mise . . . between a qualified immunity privilege rooted in the need to 
preserve the effectiveness of government . . . and the pleading re-
quirements” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
104
  Notwithstand-
ing his agreement that it was an uneasy compromise, he was con-
cerned with the potential for “subjecting high-ranking Government 
officials—entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and 
charged with responding to ‘a national and international security 
emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Repub-
lic’—to the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as non-
specific as respondent’s.”
105
  Because of this serious concern, Judge 
Cabranes passionately urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
106
  
The Supreme Court endorsed Judge Cabranes’s perspective as the 
Court quoted his language—referenced above—twice in the majority 
opinion.
107
 
III. THE MOST PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE IQBAL DECISION 
As a matter of policy, courts should reject both the interpreta-
tion that Iqbal entirely abolishes supervisory liability and the interpre-
tation that Iqbal now requires a showing of purpose or intent to cause 
the constitutional violation regardless of the underlying violation.  In 
rejecting the interpretation that Iqbal entirely eliminated supervisory 
liability, it is important to note that the foundation for permitting § 
1983 or Bivens claims against government officials for their constitu-
tional violations is derived from public policy.
108
  The scope of super-
visory liability and qualified immunity is determined by balancing the 
societal interests “of deterring constitutional misconduct and com-
pensating those whose rights have been violated” on the one hand, 
and “the governmental interest in ensuring that public officials are 
not unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties” on the oth-
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 178 (internal quotations omitted). 
 105 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945 (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 179).  
 106 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 178 (“[I]t is worth underscoring that some of those prece-
dents are less than crystal clear and fully deserve reconsideration by the Supreme 
Court at the earliest opportunity; to say the least, the guidance they provide is not 
readily harmonized.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 107 Id.   
 108 Kinports, supra note 40, at 1291–92. 
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er.
109
  In order to accomplish the goals of deterring future violations 
and compensating victims, a standard exists for holding supervisors 
liable.
110
 
Supervisors are in a unique position that includes “the power 
and resources required to implement the reforms necessary to curb 
additional wrongdoing.”
111
  As an incentive to eliminate future viola-
tions, supervisors are exposed to liability.
112
  In order to protect the 
government’s interest in preserving the officials’ abilities to perform 
their duties and avoid situations in which officials are distracted from 
their duties, society limits that exposure with the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.
113
 
This policy objective is consistent with the modern Supreme 
Court interpretations of supervisory liability under § 1983 and is also 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens to extend this 
exposure to liability to federal officials.
114
  It is highly unlikely that the 
Iqbal Court intended to eliminate 140 years of § 1983 case law and 
nearly forty years of Bivens case law in three short paragraphs.  Also, 
the language of § 1983
115
 indicates an intention that liability of super-
visors apply in more situations than just those in which the supervisor 
directly causes the violation himself or herself.  Section 1983 clearly 
states that any official is liable if he or she “subjects, or causes to be 
subjected” any citizen to the deprivation of constitutional rights.
116
  
Causing a citizen to be subjected to constitutional violations does not 
necessarily entail directly subjecting the citizen to the violation.  If it 
abolished supervisory liability entirely, the Court, as a practical mat-
ter, would create absolute immunity for government officials.  Under 
this approach, supervisors could avoid liability even when they direct-
ly instruct subordinates to cause constitutional violations. 
In addition to rejecting the interpretation that supervisory liabil-
ity is entirely eliminated, courts should also reject the interpretation 
that, post-Iqbal, all Bivens claims require a showing of purpose or in-
 
 109 Id. at 1292. 
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. at 1299. 
 112 Id. at 1300–02. 
 113 See id. at 1301. 
 114 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 288, 391 (1971).  
 115 “Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen . . . or other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
 116 Id. (emphasis added). 
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tent.  Under a thorough analysis of the Iqbal decision, both the lan-
guage of the opinion and the context in which the decision was made 
indicate that the ruling on the scope of supervisory liability was li-
mited, and it did not eliminate all Bivens claims that lack a showing of 
purpose or intent. 
A. The Context of the Iqbal Ruling 
To understand the Iqbal ruling, it is necessary to consider the is-
sue regarding supervisory liability that was actually before the Su-
preme Court.  According to the petition for certiorari, the issue was 
[w]hether a cabinet-level officer or other high ranking official 
may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional 
acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level su-
pervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination alleged-
ly carried out by such subordinate officials.
117
 
The scope of supervisory liability was not before the Court be-
cause the defendants did not contest the plaintiff’s suggested stan-
dard.
118
  The defendants had conceded that, if they had actual know-
ledge of the discriminatory nature of the plaintiff’s classification and 
had been deliberately indifferent to that discriminatory nature, they 
would be subject to supervisory liability.
119
  Because of this concession, 
the parties never argued the scope of supervisory liability.
120
  The par-
ties in Iqbal agreed to a standard of supervisory liability and the Court, 
sua sponte, unnecessarily decided that the scope was something 
else.
121
 
When the majority addressed this issue, it noted that a subordi-
nate is only liable for unconstitutional discrimination if the plaintiff 
shows purpose, rather than mere knowledge.
122
  The Court noted that 
supervisory officials are only responsible for their own misconduct 
 
 117 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 118 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  Justice Souter noted the “danger of ‘bad decisionmaking’ when the brief-
ing on a question is ‘woefully inadequate’” and pointed out that in Iqbal, the Court 
did not receive any briefing on this issue.  Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 225 (2009)).  Justice Souter continued to express 
his concern regarding the unfairness that this decision had on Iqbal who detrimen-
tally relied on his adversary’s concession and was not given the proper opportunity to 
brief the issue being decided.  Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1949 (majority opinion). 
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because there is no vicarious liability under a Bivens claim.
123
  Addi-
tionally, the Court concluded that because a subordinate is only lia-
ble upon a showing of purpose to discriminate, a supervisory official 
is only liable for unconstitutional discrimination if the plaintiff shows 
purpose to discriminate rather than mere knowledge of the subordi-
nate’s discriminatory intentions.
124
  The Court was deciding whether 
it was permissible for the subordinate’s mental state to transfer to the 
supervisory official.  The Court was not deciding whether all Bivens 
claims require a showing that the supervisory official purposefully in-
tended for a constitutional violation to occur.  As the majority opi-
nion stated, “The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will 
vary with the constitutional provision at issue.”
125
 
B. The Language of the Iqbal Ruling. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted at several points 
that “purpose rather than knowledge” is the requisite factor.
126
  This 
reference, however, is never made without a qualifying statement that 
the requirement is for an unconstitutional discrimination claim.
127
  
The importance of these quotes in context is that the Court never 
made any broad statements declaring a need for purpose or intent, 
but rather the majority limited the requirement of purpose or intent 
to those claims based on First or Fifth Amendment violations of dis-
crimination. 
In line with the limitations of the language in the Iqbal decision, 
this Comment accepts the interpretation that the scope of the Iqbal 
 
 123 Id. 
 124 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948–49. 
 125 Id. at 1948. 
 126 See id. at 1947–49. 
 127 See, e.g., id. at 1947 (“We begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must 
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert 
the defense of qualified immunity.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1948 (“The factors ne-
cessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at is-
sue.  Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth 
Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the 
defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1948–49 (“It 
follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established right, res-
pondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and 
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason 
but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 1949 (“In the context of determining whether there is a vi-
olation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather 
than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconsti-
tutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations aris-
ing from his or her superintendant responsibilities.”) (emphasis added). 
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decision is limited to intent-based claims.  Contrary to Justice Souter’s 
dissent, the requirement that the supervisory official’s mental state 
mirror that required by the underlying constitutional violation logi-
cally follows from the established principle that there is no vicarious 
liability for government officials.  Without vicarious liability, the sub-
ordinate’s faults are not imputed to the supervisor and, consequently, 
the supervisory official must satisfy the requirements of supervisory 
liability in order to be personally liable. 
In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a discrimination claim, the 
Court had previously held that the discriminatory policy or statute 
must be implemented “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group.”
128
  Thus, the foundation of 
the claim would be undermined if a supervisor were not required to 
meet that same mental element because the supervisor would then be 
held to a lower standard—vicarious liability.  This interpretation ap-
propriately balances the desire to hold supervisory officials liable to 
deter future constitutional violations and compensate victims of viola-
tions, while still protecting government officials from endless person-
al liability.  Consequently, it is appropriate to conclude that Iqbal’s 
elimination of the possibility that “knowledge and acquiescence” 
could satisfy the personal involvement requirement of supervisory 
liability is limited to intent-based claims. 
Likewise, given the limited nature of the Iqbal decision, the in-
terpretation that the scope is narrowed by the presence of exigent 
circumstances is also a feasible one.  The idea that certain situations 
require impulsive decisions and should not be evaluated in the same 
manner as those that result from extensive planning and deliberation 
is an established concept for the Court.
129
  The Court might have 
been more hesitant to hold Ashcroft and Mueller liable for the poli-
cies that they implemented while they were trying to avoid another 
terrorist attack in the wake of September 11th.  In the context of a 
national emergency “unprecedented in the history of the American 
republic,”
130
 the Court may have felt additionally compelled to pro-
 
 128 Personal Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 129 See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852 (1998) (requiring 
purpose to harm rather than deliberate indifference because “‘a deliberate indiffe-
rence standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing obli-
gations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions neces-
sarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second 
chance’” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986))). 
 130 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 178–79) (Cabranes, 
C.J., concurring).  
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vide protection to high-level officials from liability.
131
  That being said, 
the impact of the Court’s decision does not rest on national security 
interests. 
Under this analysis of the Iqbal decision, the best interpretation 
is that it impacted the supervisory liability standard by clarifying the 
requisite mental state that a plaintiff must plead in order for a super-
visory official to be held personally liable for the constitutional viola-
tions of his or her subordinates.  Before Iqbal, there was no set stan-
dard, and courts implemented different requirements.  Some courts 
required recklessness,
132
 others required only a showing of knowledge 
and acquiescence,
133
 and one court permitted the imposition of liabil-
ity upon only a showing of gross negligence by the supervisor.
134
 
Now, post-Iqbal, the supervisor’s mental state must reflect the 
mental state that the underlying constitutional violation sets forth.  
Namely, for a First or Fifth Amendment violation, a claimant must 
show that the supervisor had the requisite purpose or intent to cause 
the violation;
135
 for a Fourth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must 
show that the supervisor was objectively unreasonable;
136
 and for an 
Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must show that the super-
visor acted recklessly towards the individual’s constitutional rights.
137
  
In sum, the most plausible reading of the Iqbal decision in the con-
text of supervisory liability is that the mental state of the supervisor 
must mirror that of the subordinate.  The ruling that “knowledge and 
acquiescence” will no longer suffice to establish personal involvement 
was limited to intent-based claims because mere knowledge of an un-
derling’s discrimination is not proof that the supervisor himself had 
the invidious intent to discriminate. 
Intent-based claims, like those presented in Iqbal, rightfully re-
quire intent on the part of the supervisor.  There are, however, a host 
 
 131 While the language of the decision insinuates that the more plausible interpre-
tation is that the ruling was limited to intent-based claims, the Court’s reluctance to 
impose personal liability on Ashcroft and Mueller is almost certainly relevant to the 
national security interests at the center of these policy decisions.  Specifically, the 
Court was likely motivated to reach the outcome it did because of a concern for the 
exigent circumstances that surrounded Ashcroft and Mueller’s decision-making re-
sponsibilities. 
 132 E.g., Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006); Estate 
of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005).  
 133 E.g., Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003); Doe v. 
City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 134 Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 135 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976). 
 136 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 137 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994). 
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of standards for other violations and the required mental element 
should mirror that of the underlying violation.  This requirement, in 
addition to the required showing of the supervisor’s personal in-
volvement,
138
 sufficiently shields government officials from respon-
deat superior. 
IV. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR SUPERVISORY LIABILITY 
The doctrine of supervisory liability is complex and multifaceted.  
As a result, there is a significant need for a clear and uniform stan-
dard for all courts throughout the country to apply consistently.  Un-
iformity throughout jurisdictions is necessary because of situations—
such as the one in Iqbal—in which the government official is in such a 
high position that he oversees subordinates throughout the United 
States.  By adopting one set standard, the Supreme Court would ena-
ble government officials to conform their conduct to the established 
requirements, such that officials would not fear the ramifications of 
inconsistent personal liability standards throughout the country. 
After analyzing several variations of the standard for supervisory 
liability, this Comment suggests a two-prong test that will sufficiently 
balance the interests of the government officials and those of indi-
vidual citizens.  Government officials aim to avoid liability for the de-
cisions they make within the scope of their official roles.
139
  Similarly, 
courts seek to compensate victims of constitutional violations and in-
duce high-level officials to more thoroughly implement and oversee 
policies that eliminate the occurrence of these violations.
140
  Given 
these concerns, this Comment’s two-prong test requires: (1) a show-
ing of personal involvement on the part of the supervisor, and (2) a 
showing of the requisite mental state that is derived from the underly-
ing constitutional violation at issue.
141
 
These requirements are not new concepts to the doctrine of su-
pervisory liability.  Rather, courts have consistently used these con-
cepts, and the Iqbal decision reiterated their existence.  This Com-
ment suggests a test that will clarify and explain these longstanding 
principles.  In Dunlop v. Monroe, a case from 1812, the Supreme Court 
first introduced the idea that, in order to be liable, a supervisor must 
be personally involved in the underlying wrongdoing.
142
  In Dunlop, 
 
 138 See discussion infra Part V. 
 139 See Kinports, supra note 40, at 1293–94. 
 140 Id. at 1294. 
 141 This second prong reflects the ruling from Iqbal. 
 142 11 U.S. 242 (1812). 
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the Court determined the circumstances under which a postmaster 
would be liable for his subordinate’s errors.
143
  While this case was de-
cided two hundred years ago, its holding is consistent with current 
case law
144
 and was cited by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
145
  
Essentially, the Court held that the postmaster must be personally in-
volved in his subordinate’s wrongdoing.
146
  According to the Court, 
the alleged failure-to-supervise claim could feasibly satisfy the person-
al involvement requirement so long as the plaintiff alleged that the 
postmaster affirmatively failed to supervise, presumably either with 
knowledge of the subordinate’s errors or with some type of an affir-
mative duty to do so.
147
  Based on this rationale, the Court held that a 
plaintiff could not simply allege that the postmaster was the supervi-
sor of the subordinate who caused the violation and that he was con-
sequently liable merely due to his supervisory position alone.
148
  Thus, 
by 1812, the Court had already established that respondeat superior 
would be insufficient.
149
 
Regarding the required mental state, court decisions have varied 
depending on the jurisdiction and the details of the violation,
150
 but 
the significance of Iqbal is that it clarifies this prong.
151
  Now, regard-
less of the jurisdiction, in order for a supervisor to be liable for the 
violations of his or her subordinates, the plaintiff must show that the 
supervisor’s mental state mirrored that of the subordinate—the men-
tal state derived from the relevant constitutional provision that forms 
the basis of the claim.
152
  This outcome is completely in line with the 
 
 143 Id. at 244. 
 144 See, e.g., Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the 
alleged constitutional violation, but personal involvement is not limited solely to sit-
uations where a defendant violates a plaintiff’s rights by physically placing hands on 
him.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 145 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 
 146 Dunlop, 11 U.S. at 269. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. 
 150 See, e.g., Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003); Poe v. Leonard, 
282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 151 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (“The factors necessary to 
establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.  Where 
the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amend-
ments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the de-
fendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”). 
 152 See id. 
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theory that there is no vicarious liability for government officials—the 
subordinate’s guilty mind is not imputed to the supervisor. 
In conducting this analysis, it is important to note that the re-
quirement of personal involvement and the requisite mental element 
are often conflated.
153
  Some courts have concluded that a showing of 
knowledge and acquiescence or deliberate indifference alone will sa-
tisfy the supervisory liability standard.
154
  This Comment rejects that 
contention on the basis that it does not sufficiently protect a govern-
ment official’s interests in avoiding liability simply for being in an au-
thoritative position.
155
  Knowledge and acquiescence as well as delibe-
rate indifference may satisfy the personal involvement prong, but the 
required mental state is also necessary in order to fully satisfy the su-
pervisory liability standard. 
The test that this Comment proposes first requires a showing 
that the supervisory official was personally involved in the violation 
and second, that he or she exhibited the required mental state in re-
gards to the violation.  To clarify the first requirement, this Comment 
now directly addresses the Court’s language of a “personal involve-
ment” requirement and clarifies what types of acts can satisfy this 
prong.  In order to do this, it is useful to analyze pre-Iqbal case law. 
Even though Iqbal makes clear that a plaintiff must show that the 
high-level official had some personal involvement with the subordi-
nate’s actions, courts are still unclear as to what personal involvement 
means.
156
  Some courts have interpreted personal involvement nar-
rowly, essentially requiring direct involvement.
157
  Based on the policy 
rationale behind supervisory liability, this cannot be a correct applica-
tion of the personal involvement requirement because personal in-
volvement is not synonymous with direct contact.
158
  As a policy mat-
ter, this would mean that high-level officials would be permitted to 
implement intentionally discriminatory policies and avoid liability by 
simply requiring that their subordinates follow them through.  So 
 
 153 See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 154 See id. 
 155 See supra Part III.  
 156 See Arias v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of the Dep’t. of 
Homeland Sec., No. 07-1959, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61519, at *9–10 (D. Minn. July 
17, 2009) (holding that high-level government officials are personally liable only 
when they have direct involvement with the individual plaintiffs or when a failure to 
supervise or train causes the deprivation of constitutional rights). 
 157 See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that personal involvement can only be satisfied by personal direction or, in limited 
circumstances, with particularized assertions, knowledge and acquiescence). 
 158 See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). 
GRACE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2012  5:22 PM 
2012] COMMENT 341 
long as those high officials never left their offices and never had di-
rect contact with any of the individuals whose rights were violated by 
the policies, they would never be personally liable under a §1983 or 
Bivens claim.  As a policy matter, this cannot be correct. 
A. Prior Supreme Court Decisions 
The Supreme Court addressed personal involvement in the su-
pervisory liability context on several occasions prior to Iqbal.  In un-
derstanding the current state of the personal involvement require-
ment and the evolution of the supervisory liability standard generally, 
it is helpful to outline those major cases that led up to Iqbal. 
First, in Rizzo v. Goode, plaintiffs brought two class actions against 
Philadelphia’s mayor, the city’s managing director, and supervisory 
police officials.
159
  The plaintiffs sought equitable relief for an alleged-
ly pervasive pattern of unconstitutional police mistreatment of city 
residents, in particular the minority citizens.
160
  The District Court 
held the defendants liable because of their failure to act in the face of 
the statistical pattern of misconduct.
161
  The court entered an order 
that required the implementation of a new program designed to pre-
vent future misconduct,
162
 and the Third Circuit affirmed.
163
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the evidence on the 
record did not establish that the named defendants had imple-
mented any policy to violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff 
classes.
164
  The lower court had found that there was evidence of a de-
partmental procedure indicating a tendency to discourage the filing 
of civilian complaints and to minimize the consequences of police 
misconduct.
165
  The Supreme Court, however, held that the violators 
of the named plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were individual police 
officers not named in the action.
166
  In regard to the supervisory offi-
cials, the Court held that there was no affirmative link between a plan 
or policy implemented by the defendants and the violations that the 
plaintiffs endured.
167
  The “affirmative link” language seemingly be-
 
 159 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976). 
 160 Id. at 366–67. 
 161 Id. at 366. 
 162 Id. at 364. 
 163 Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev’d 423 U.S. 362. 
 164 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375. 
 165 Id. at 368–69. 
 166 Id. at 367. 
 167 Id. at 371. 
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came the foundation of the causation requirement and the personal 
involvement requirement that would evolve in later cases. 
In Rizzo, the named defendants were merely in supervisory posi-
tions and did not exhibit any personal involvement with the individu-
al plaintiffs’ violations.
168
  The district court concluded that “even 
without a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small 
percentage of the police force, petitioner’s failure to act in the face of 
a statistical pattern is indistinguishable from the active conduct” in 
previous case law.
169
  The Supreme Court rejected this possibility and 
required that supervisory officials only be held liable for their own con-
duct.
170
 
Thus, Rizzo established that an affirmative link must exist be-
tween the supervisor and the violation.  If a plaintiff aims to show a 
“failure to act” to satisfy the personal involvement prong, the Rizzo 
Court declared that the existence of a statistical pattern of miscon-
duct is insufficient.
171
  Presumably, a plaintiff would need to show that 
the supervisor had actual knowledge of the misconduct that was oc-
curring and, despite that knowledge, failed to act. 
The next major case to address the issue of supervisory liability 
was City of Canton v. Harris.
172
  In that case, the police arrested the 
plaintiff and took her into custody.
173
  Because she was continuously 
falling over, the police asked if she needed medical attention; she re-
sponded incoherently.
174
  Upon her release from custody one hour 
later, the plaintiff’s family took her to the hospital where she was di-
agnosed with several emotional ailments.
175
  She was then hospitalized 
for one week and thereafter completed outpatient treatment for a 
year.
176
 
The plaintiff subsequently filed a § 1983 claim alleging that, un-
der the municipal regulations, police shift commanders had sole dis-
cretion to determine if someone in custody needed medical atten-
 
 168 Id. at 375. 
 169 Id. at 375–76 (discussing the underlying rationale of the district court opi-
nion). 
 170 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377 (distinguishing the factual situation of Rizzo v. Goode from 
the previous decisions of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 
(1971), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 171 Id. at 375–76. 
 172 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
 173 Id. at 381.  
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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tion.
177
  The municipality,
178
 however, did not provide training to 
those shift commanders to teach them how to make such determina-
tions; thus, the municipal liability claim was based on a failure to 
train.
179
 
The Supreme Court held that inadequacy of police training may 
be the basis of § 1983 liability only when the failure to train amounts 
to a deliberate indifference to the rights of people with whom the po-
lice might come in contact.
180
  In order for an action to amount to de-
liberate indifference, “a deliberate choice to follow a course of ac-
tion . . . [must be] made from among various alternatives by city 
policymakers . . . [and] [o]nly where a failure to train reflects a ‘deli-
berate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality” will the courts impose 
liability.
181
 
This case is significant in the evolution of the supervisory liability 
standard because it set out the basis for deliberate indifference as a 
method of satisfying the personal involvement prong.  In City of Can-
ton, the Court determined that deliberate indifference was satisfied if 
decision-makers had multiple choices and opted for the action that 
created an obvious risk of resulting violations.
182
  In addition, this case 
set out the relationship between the mental requirement and the act 
requirement and demonstrated how easy it can be to conflate these 
two distinct prongs.
183
 
The final case to analyze regarding the history of the supervisory 
liability standard is Board of County Commissioners v. Brown.
184
  In Brown, 
the plaintiff was injured after a police deputy pulled him out of a 
truck following a police chase.
185
  The plaintiff based the § 1983 claim 
on the county’s inadequate screening when it hired the deputy be-
cause the deputy had a conviction for assault and battery, as well as 
other misdemeanor convictions.
186
  The personal involvement prong 
 
 177 Id. at 381–82. 
 178 This case dealt with entity liability rather than liability of supervisory officials.  
The Court previously held that a municipal entity is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, so the case law pertaining to § 1983 applies to entity liability.  Monell v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 179 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 382. 
 180 Note that an omission—a failure to act, supervise, or train—can satisfy the per-
sonal involvement prong.  See id. 
 181 Id. at 389 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483–84 (1986)). 
 182 See id. 
 183 See id. 
 184 520 U.S. 397(1997). 
 185 Id. at 399–400.  
 186 Id. at 401. 
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was the failure to screen, while the hiring amounted to deliberate in-
difference.
187
 
In deciding whether liability attached, the Supreme Court expli-
citly stated that even if “inadequate scrutiny of an applicant’s back-
ground would make a violation of rights more likely [, this] cannot 
alone give rise to an inference that a policymaker’s failure to scrutin-
ize the record of a particular applicant produced a specific constitu-
tional violation.”
188
  Thus, the Court held that a failure to screen con-
stitutes deliberate indifference and consequently satisfies the 
supervisory liability standard, but only in situations where the depri-
vation of constitutionally protected rights would be the unmistakably 
obvious consequence of hiring the potential applicant.
189
  The Court 
also stated that “[i]n any § 1983 suit, [the] plaintiff must establish the 
state of mind required to prove the underlying violation.”
190
  This lan-
guage strengthens the argument that Iqbal was not a groundbreaking 
case for the doctrine of supervisory liability.  Instead, the Iqbal lan-
guage is similar, if not identical, to the language used in prior Su-
preme Court cases, including in City of Canton. 
B. Prior Lower Court Decisions 
In order to reach a clear and uniform standard for the personal 
involvement prong of supervisory liability, the next step is to analyze 
how lower courts have interpreted these Supreme Court decisions.  
In general, jurisdictions differ in the type of actions they permit to sa-
tisfy the personal involvement requirement.
191
  For example, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that, 
to be held liable, the supervisor need not be directly and perso-
nally involved in the same way as are the individual officers who 
are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury.  Rather, the su-
pervisor’s participation could include his own culpable action or 
inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordi-
nates, his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which 
the complaint is made, or conduct that showed a reckless or call-
ous indifference to the rights of others.
192
 
 
 187 See id. 
 188 Id. at 410–11 (emphasis added). 
 189 See id. 
 190 Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. 
 191 See infra text accompanying notes 192–196. 
 192 Starr v. Baca, No. 09-55233, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15283, at *6 (9th Cir. July 
25, 2011) (quoting Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991))(internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that personal involvement 
is satisfied through allegations of (1) personal direction or (2) actual 
knowledge and acquiescence.
193
  This means that a supervisor would 
be liable if he or she directly instructed a subordinate to do some-
thing that would cause a constitutional deprivation to the third party, 
or if he or she actually knew that a subordinate was doing something 
that would violate a third party’s constitutional rights and the supervi-
sory official acquiesced in that behavior.
194
 
Yet another standard exists in the Second Circuit, which has 
held that “[i]t is well settled . . . that ‘personal involvement of defen-
dants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an 
award of damages under § 1983.’”
195
  The court has elaborated on the 
requisite showing by stating that 
the personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be 
shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in 
the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being 
informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to 
remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom 
under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the 
continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was 
grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the 
wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indiffe-
rence to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information in-
dicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.
196
 
As noted by this analysis of relevant circuit court opinions, the 
standard for satisfying the personal involvement prong varies signifi-
cantly among the circuits.  In striving for a uniform standard, it is ne-
cessary to set out an exhaustive list of actions that will satisfy the per-
sonal involvement prong of supervisory liability for courts in all 
jurisdictions to apply.  After analyzing the different variations, this 
Comment will consolidate all of the relevant actions into three main 
categories.  Namely, a supervisory official would be deemed personal-
ly involved in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights 
when said official either (1) directly caused the constitutional viola-
 
 193 Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Zion v. Nassan, 727 
F. Supp. 2d 388, 405–08 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Mincy v. McConnell, No. 09-236, 2010 WL 
3092681, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2010); Liberty & Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. Corzine, 
720 F. Supp. 2d 622, 628–30 (D.N.J. 2010); Bullock v. Beard, No. 3:10-cv-401, 2010 
WL 1507228, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2010). 
 194 See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353.  
 195 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 
21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 196 Id. (citing Wright, 21 F.3d at 501). 
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tion, either through direct instruction or direct involvement; (2) was 
deliberately indifferent to the rights of the victim; or (3) had know-
ledge of the subordinate’s conduct that caused the violation and ac-
quiesced in said conduct. 
As to the first means of satisfying the personal involvement re-
quirement—directly depriving a third party of his or her constitu-
tionally protected rights—the supervisory official may be liable even 
without the doctrine of supervisory liability.
197
  Under these circums-
tances, a plaintiff might successfully bring a civil claim for a constitu-
tional violation under § 1983 or Bivens generally without the need to 
rely on the supervisory liability standard.  Without direct participa-
tion, the plaintiff would still satisfy this requirement by showing that 
the supervisory official directly instructed the subordinate. 
In satisfying the second option—deliberate indifference—the 
plaintiff must show that the supervisory official disregarded an ob-
vious consequence of his or her actions.
198
  Finally, to satisfy the third 
option—knowledge and acquiescence—the plaintiff must show that 
the supervisory official had knowledge of the violation or the poten-
tial for the violation and acquiesced in the subordinate’s conduct, 
which then caused the violation.
199
  Presumably, most actions that are 
typically alleged in supervisory liability cases would fall into one of 
these three categories.  For example, claims of failure to train, failure 
to supervise, or failure to screen while hiring would fit under the de-
liberate indifference standard, so long as the supervisors acted reck-
lessly.  Similarly, failure to discipline or failure to remedy would fall 
within the knowledge and acquiescence option.  As a matter of policy, 
it would be impractical for a supervisory official to avoid liability for 
depriving an individual of constitutional rights simply because the 
official was not present and solely responsible.  Liability should attach 
when supervisors set in motion a series of acts that ultimately cause 
the violation. 
As this Comment has now set up the ways in which a plaintiff can 
satisfy the personal involvement prong, it is crucial to remember that 
satisfying that prong is not dispositive for satisfying the supervisory 
liability standard.
200
  In addition, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead 
the requisite mental state derived from the underlying violation.
201
  
 
 197 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 198 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 
 199 See, e.g., Womack v. Smith, No. 1:06-CV-2348, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120728, at 
*13 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2009). 
 200 See supra text accompanying notes 139–42. 
 201 See id. 
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Namely, the common mental state requirements include: intent or 
purpose for First or Fifth Amendment claims,
202
 objective unreasona-
bleness for Fourth Amendment claims,
203
 and recklessness for Eighth 
Amendment claims.
204
  In sum, a plaintiff will satisfy the supervisory 
liability standard only when both of the requisite prongs are suffi-
ciently pled. 
C. Implications of this Comment’s Proposed Test 
This table demonstrates the implications of this Comment’s test 
by setting out the requisite showing by a plaintiff seeking to succeed 
on a claim of supervisory liability against a supervisory official.
205
 
 
 Direct Causation Deliberate Indifference Knowledge and  
Acquiescence 
First or Fifth 
Amendment  
Violations 
 
(Purpose or 
Intent Re-
quired)
206 
Officials are liable for di-
rectly
207
 engaging in the 
violating behavior with the 
purpose to discriminate. 
Officials are liable for 
ignoring an obvious risk 
or consequence
208
 of 
their actions with the 
purpose to discriminate. 
Officials are liable 
for knowing that 
subordinates are en-
gaging in certain 
behavior and ac-
quiescing
209
 in that 
behavior with the 
purpose
210
 to discri-
minate.
211
 
 
 202 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33, 
540 (1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
 203 See U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 204 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1998). 
 205 Note that this table does not directly implicate the doctrine of qualified im-
munity.  Consequently, a supervisory official within these situations could succeed on 
a motion to dismiss under qualified immunity if he or she could show that the law 
governing his or her actions was not clearly established or that a reasonable official 
in his or her position would have considered his or her conduct to be lawful.  See 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  
 206 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).   
 207 By directly engaging in the violating conduct, this could mean that their role as 
supervisors is essentially irrelevant.  In these situations, they are directly responsible, 
rather than being responsible in the context of their decision-making authority.  
Another action that falls within this category would be directly instructing a subordi-
nate to do something that causes a violation (i.e., directing a subordinate police of-
ficer to conduct an unlawful search). 
 208 A commonly cited example of a supervisor ignoring an obvious risk is a failure 
to train police officers in the use of firearms.  
 209 Common examples of knowledge and acquiescence include when supervisors 
are aware of certain issues and fail to discipline those subordinates that are responsi-
ble or fail to remedy their policies or practices. 
 210 Note that this is undoubtedly an issue for pleading because a plaintiff must 
plead, without simply making conclusory statements, that the supervisory officials in-
tended their policies or actions to result in constitutional violations of third parties. 
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Fourth 
Amendment 
Violations 
 
(Objective 
Unreason-
ableness)
212 
Officials are liable for di-
rectly conducting the ob-
jectively unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
Officials are liable for 
ignoring an obvious risk 
or consequence of their 
actions and they were 
objectively unreasonable 
in acting in such a man-
ner. 
Officials are liable 
for knowing that 
subordinates are en-
gaging in certain 
behavior and ac-
quiescing in that 
behavior when doing 
so is objectively un-
reasonable. 
Eighth 
Amendment 
Violations 
 
(Reckless-
ness)
213 
Officials are liable for di-
rectly engaging in the vi-
olating behavior—namely 
causing the cruel and un-
usually behavior – and 
doing so in a reckless 
manner. 
Officials are liable for 
recklessly ignoring an 
obvious risk or conse-
quence of their actions. 
Officials are liable 
for knowing that 
subordinates are en-
gaging in certain 
behavior and reck-
lessly acquiescing in 
that behavior. 
 
In applying the test put forth in this Comment, a plaintiff may 
succeed on a claim for a First or Fifth Amendment violation upon a 
showing that the supervisory defendant was directly involved in the 
violation and acted in the manner alleged with the purpose or intent 
to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  Alternatively, the plain-
tiff may show that the supervisory official purposefully ignored an ob-
vious risk or consequence that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights 
would be violated, with the intent to cause such a violation.  Finally, a 
plaintiff may succeed on a First or Fifth Amendment claim by show-
ing that the supervisory official had knowledge of the subordinate’s 
improper conduct and acquiesced in said conduct with the purpose 
or intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 
Similarly, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment violation claim, 
the plaintiff may show that the supervisory official directly caused the 
violation and acted objectively unreasonably in doing so.  Alternative-
ly, the plaintiff may show that the supervisory official was objectively 
 
 211 This is the situation from Iqbal, in which the allegation was that Ashcroft and 
Mueller had knowledge of the discriminatory conduct occurring—deeming certain 
suspects “high interest” and subjecting them to harsher conditions of confinement—
and acquiesced in the subordinates’ conduct by creating this policy of investigation 
and incarceration and allowing the policy to continue.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1944 (2009).  Iqbal likely satisfied the personal involvement prong by showing 
that the supervisory officials had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the violating con-
duct.  See id.  What he failed to do was satisfy the requisite-mental-state prong by 
showing that Ashcroft and Mueller acquiesced in the violating behavior with the 
purpose to discriminate.  See id.  Note that this requirement is in line with Washington 
v. Davis, which explicitly states that discrimination claims will only succeed if the 
challenged statute was implemented “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” the dis-
criminatory effect.  426 U.S. 229 (1976).  Thus, while Iqbal did not deal with a statute, 
the same can be said of the policy.  See id. 
 212 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 213 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994). 
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unreasonable in ignoring an obvious risk or consequence that the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights would be violated.  Finally, the plaintiff 
may succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim by showing that the su-
pervisory official had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the subordi-
nate’s improper conduct that caused the violation, and that acquiesc-
ing in said conduct was objectively unreasonable. 
Lastly, to succeed on an Eighth Amendment violation claim, the 
plaintiff may show that the official was reckless in directly causing the 
violation.  Alternatively, the plaintiff may show that the supervisory 
official recklessly ignored an obvious risk or consequence resulting in 
the violation of plaintiff’s rights.  Finally, a plaintiff may succeed on 
an Eighth Amendment claim upon a showing that the supervisory 
official knew of, and recklessly acquiesced in, behavior that violated 
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court stated that “the term ‘supervisory 
liability’ is a misnomer.”
214
  Many courts and scholars alike have inter-
preted this opinion to mean that supervisory liability was abolished or 
that supervisors are liable only when they meet the same standards 
that subordinates are required to meet.
215
  For both practical and pol-
icy reasons, this cannot be an accurate reading of the Iqbal decision.  
To be a misnomer is to be misnamed.  The term “supervisory liabili-
ty,” on its face, implies the assumption of liability simply by means of 
being a supervisor.  In this regard, the term is a misnomer.  Rather 
than being liable simply for being a high-level official, supervisors are 
liable only under certain circumstances. 
Iqbal clarified and confirmed that one requirement for said cir-
cumstances is that a plaintiff must show that the supervisor exhibited 
the requisite mental state as established by the underlying constitu-
tional violation.
216
  As noted in Iqbal, but established quite clearly in 
previous Supreme Court case law, the other requirement is that the 
supervisor be personally involved in the deprivation of the constitu-
tionally protected rights. 
Based on several circuits’ analyses of the personal involvement 
requirement, an appropriate uniform standard of supervisory liability 
includes three potential means of satisfying that prong: (1) a showing 
that the supervisory official directly caused the constitutional viola-
 
 214 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 215 See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 37. 
 216 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; see discussion supra Part III. 
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tion firsthand, (2) a showing that the supervisory official was delibe-
rately indifferent to the risk of the constitutional violation, or (3) a 
showing that the supervisory official had knowledge of the behavior 
causing the violation and acquiesced in that behavior.  Likewise, to 
meet the supervisory liability standard, the satisfaction of one of the 
three enumerated personal involvement showings must be accompa-
nied by the requisite mental state for the particular constitutional 
claim at hand.
217
 
In sum, Iqbal was not a groundbreaking decision regarding the 
standard for supervisory liability.  Rather, Iqbal merely clarified that in 
order to satisfy the supervisory liability standard, the supervisor’s re-
quisite mental state must be derived from the underlying constitu-
tional claim.  In addition to the mental state requirement clarified in 
Iqbal, Supreme Court case law indicates, and Iqbal confirmed, that 
there is a personal involvement requirement as well.
218
  Based on the 
standard that this Comment sets out, a plaintiff must meet both re-
quirements in order to succeed on a § 1983 or Bivens claim.  With the 
confusion in the wake of the Iqbal decision, society demands clarifica-
tion, and with the high stakes and pertinent policy implications of 
that clarification, society demands a comprehensible, uniform stan-
dard like the one put forth in this Comment. 
 
 
 217 See discussion supra Part. IV.C. 
 218 See, e.g., Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888). 
